The Iranian-Arab critical scene in the field of studying narrative discourses and analyzing the Quranic narrative opened up to its Western counterpart, from which it derived most of its theoretical concepts, methods of procedural practice, and critical mechanisms. Each researcher dealt with the studied narrative discourse according to his own inclination and orientation, and on the basis of the approach he adopted in the analysis, and the negative side in this approach is represented in projecting the method on the text and employing it mechanically, as this aspect of employing the method raised a crisis in the Iranian and Arab narrative scene in the study of the Quranic narrative. And he touched-at times-the sanctity of the studied discourse and its divine truth. From this standpoint, our research came to investigate the critical models that adopted the procedures of Narratology criticism in their applied practices on the Quranic discourse in a DOGMATIC manner, to approach the reality of this criticism, and then shed light on some of the applications made by Arab and Iranian researchers in this field. The research concluded in the end that the method in the understanding of some researchers has turned into engineering tools with limits and dimensions that cannot be touched upon application, so he leads them and devotes their efforts to revealing the textual units and segments that make up the Quranic narrative discourse. So, the problem of employing Narratology in the study of the Qur’, anic discourse is mainly due to the difficulty of employing its procedural mechanisms and transferring them from the space of human narrations to a space different from it, which is the Qur’, anic narration. It produces a set of ambiguous data that makes the discourse lose its aesthetics, and affects the essence of its function, as criticism eventually turns into a crowd of unreliable judgments, due to its failure to keep pace with an effective analytical critical movement, and this gap is one of the risks that studies have suffered from throughout their critical practice.

Immanuel Kant says in Prolegomena that “ the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my DOGMATIC slumber” . Despite this confession, it is still not clear just how Hume awoke Kant from his DOGMATIC slumber. Interpreters’ disagreement springs from the fact that there is no consensus over any aspect of this influence. Did Hume’ s critique of causality awake Kant, or his discussion of antinomies of imagination? If the former is the case, which discussion of causality? Has Kant been familiar with Hume’ s own works? In the introduction of the paper, we distinguish three different questions. In the first part of the paper, we deal with the historical aspect of Hume’ s influence on Kant and the degree of Kant’ s familiarity with Hume’ s two famous works, Treatise and Enquiry. In the second part, firstly, we deal with the interpretative aspect of Kant’ s relation to Hume and argue that it was Hume’ s discussion and critique of the epistemic and semantic status of “ general causal principle” in Treatise which finally awoke Kant from his DOGMATIC slumber. If our account of Hume’ s major influence on Kant is accepted, then Hume’ s other impacts should be explicated light of our explanation. In conclusion, we offer some of the findings of this paper.

One may say that The Open Society and Its Enemies (OS) offered in 1945 the first complete elaboration of the general approach proposed by Karl Popper, namely his ‘critical rationalism’, a bold generalization of the fallibilist falsificationism in the domain of the empirical sciences masterly proposed in Logik der Forschung (1934). The political content of The OS has been critically discussed. Nevertheless, not all people insist on the equally important moral dimension of the book, giving it its unity, I submit. Without morality, no critical discussion, no REASON, no open society, let us say in a nutshell. I would argue that according to Popper, a strictly Christian morality of love would not be the appropriate emotional companion of critical rationalism, but that the less demanding moral emotion of sympathy or compassion is perhaps necessary to give it its force against violence. I give some support to this line of argument. In my view, Popper proposed a somewhat unarticulated critical rationalist ‘emotivism’ of sorts. The emotion of compassion is necessary for triggering our moral decisions and values, which are the ultimate basis of the choice for a REASON against violence.

In this paper, the need for interfaith dialogue in the contemporary world has been emphasized in the light of the rise of ISIS and other takfiri movements. This necessity has been understood both by political and religious authorities in the Shiite world and by Christian religious authorities. It will be shown that the central message of all Abrahamic religions is theism; that is, the worship of God and justice as opposed to egotism or self-worship. Then, it will be explained how, in the context of interreligious dialogue, relativism as opposed to realism is a main philosophical barrier, and exclusivism as opposed to inclusivism tends to be a major DOGMATIC barrier.

Modernity theories occupy a vast scope in the literature, representing philosophical, historical-civil, sociological-historical approaches, and sociology of religion. Various analytical methods and theories with specific titles and characteristics have been developed within any of these approaches. The present research started with the assumption that all these approaches in this wide-ranging spectrum revolve around action and reaction concepts on one hand, and self-founded and communicative REASON on the other. By using this framework, the above-mentioned notions can be conceptualized and differentiated as the main focus of this study. Our research hypothesis states that modernity theories began with the self-founded and autonomic action and then were extended to communicative REASON and interaction. It follows that, the theorists’ who attempted to explain the essence of modernity moved from philosophy to sociology in form of a process by which the society was rationalized while conceptualizing REASON made a passage through transcendental to instrumental and then to communicative REASON. The focus of this research is on the exploration of this path by the use of a historical-hermeneutical approach.

Is there any domain beyond REASON that is paradoxical and the oppositeof REASON?This question always makes mysticism face philosophy. Therefore the two domains of REASON and beyond REASON and the relation between them have been always attended to by the Gnostics and students of gnosis and religion in both the Christian West and Islamic East. W.T. Stace maintained that the judgments of the domain of REASON are paradoxical, interpreting a phrase of Meister Eckhart.Mulla Sadra has offered an interesting thesis in this field interpreting Aynolgozat and Ghazalis words. This thesis reveals minute details that have been ignored. In this paper we have used comparative method to show the depth of his view.

Challenge of the mystic with philosopher is one form of opposition to philosophy. Philosophy is attacked throughout history through three regions of religious dogmatists, anti-religious emperisists, and devoted mystics with different intentions. Among most fascinating discussions in the history of human thought is the dispute between thought and intuition, REASON and love, and knowledge and insight. Mystics are pessimistic of power of REASON in the perception of problems of metaphysics and anti-rationality is observed in works of their majority. In such works, REASON is put in opposition to three affairs: heart, love, and perplexity. Intellectuality and recommending impotence and perplexity is the central element of disagreement between mysticism and philosophy. Mystic is enamored of perplexity but philosopher is anti-perplexity. Perplexity primarily seems to be in contradiction to such categories as knowledge, guidance, faith, and belief. the nature of perplexity and expounding its proportion to the said catego.ries is the main object of this research.

Introduction In criminal law, balancing individual and social rights is a kind of justice that must be taken into account in criminal proceedings. In modern criminal law, requirements such as avoiding violations of physical rights, etc., are governed by ways and means of obtaining and collecting evidence, all of which are rooted in the principle of the legitimacy of REASON. But in the meantime, there are a number of contexts that influence these requirements and cause authorities to take advantage of methods that more likely to depart from the norms of principle of the legitimacy when collecting evidence of crime. The present paper examines the aforementioned contexts. Methodology Documentary and library methods were used to study the subject. Accordingly, the criminal law doctrines that have been written in the field of proof of the criminal case in various books and articles which surveyed the principle of the legitimacy of REASON and the legitimacy of REASON have examined; They were analyzed and described without using statistical indices with descriptive-analytic method. Findings Despite the use of illegitimate REASONing methods and incompatible practices with our ethical, religious and legal foundations, but existing facts, such as the lack of specialized crime discovery facilities, lead REASON gaining to use these methods; In a way, the criminal prosecutor knowing that the police have used unauthorized methods to obtain evidence and cites the evidence presented in this way. Conclusion In criminal law, the principle of the legitimacy of REASON gaining is one of the most important and fundamental principles of protecting, guarding and supervising criminal proceedings in order to fulfill their individual and social security. however, there are a number of contextual contexts in the criminal justice system that lead REASON obtaining authorities, including the police, to depart from the principle of REASON legitimacy. Predicting systematic and systematic laws for the study of the cause will remove the problem of personal and social security.

The subject matter of this article is not to determine the priority of REASON to heart or privacy of rationality to love, but find out the answers to these questions: what is role of REASON and rational knowledge in attaining mystical intuitive visions? How far does the horizon of rational knowledge extend from perspective of Ibn Arabi? Given the fact that mysticism is arena for esoteric vision and disclosure, is there any room for REASON to play active part? Last but not least, how do proponents and opponents of REASON define the similarities and differences in the subject in question?It is worth noting that REASON is clearly different from rational knowledge but in the present article it is used in the sense of the latter.

One of the debates concerning Hume’s Philosophy is whether he believes in God. Through investigating his own works and extraction of his assertions concerning God, we try in this paper to examine the internal consistency of his system. In order to do this, we shall analytically examine whether the current tags attached to him are consistent with implications of his works. This research shows that it is problematic to call him an “atheist” or an “agnostic”. Furthermore, the findings of this paper shows that his minimal belief in God can be found in all of his works. Finally, according to the results, it is suggested to call him a weak or non-DOGMATIC agnostic.